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The contemporary West is curiously obsessed with the creation of models of 
the world, the game of inventing explanatory fictions. The fonction fabulatnce 
(Bergson’s term) is generally assumed to be a vital and necessary item in the 
human equipment for survival. Perhaps the most radical version of such a 
critical need is the existential one, according to which, lacking a constitutive 
identity (a fixed ego sense), man invents himself from moment to moment and 
chooses in anguish amid the throng of possibilities. He is compelled to be free, 
condemned to be his own fabulist, like the spider spinning habitable patterns 
out of his own substance. As such a metaphor implies, in all his projections man 
encounters nothing but himself. It is at this point that a sophisticated modem 
insight touches the Buddha’s “awakening.” With exemplary clarity he too ex­
perienced the ultimate insubstantiality of all inventions of identity. To adapt 
his own metaphor he witnessed the collapse of the ‘house of fiction’ (Dham- 
mapada 154). The most influential English exposition of a theory of fiction which 
is grounded in such assumptions is Frank Kermode’s The Sense of an Ending.1 
It is particularly congenial to the purpose of this short comparative exploration 
in its anti-historical thrust and in its conflation of fictions of all kinds, theological, 
scientific and literary. So that in this sense the abyss of historical accident which 
separates such a contemporary theory from the Buddha’s own attitudes to 
man’s need for fictions dissolves. We shall discover much common ground 
between the two as well as some spectacular divergencies. We can try to 
establish the common ground first of all.
1 Frank Kermode, The Seme of an Ending (London, 1967). Subsequent page references 
are to this edition.
In Professor Kermode’s view the root of the function fabulatrice lies in simple 
“need,” itself induced by the rudimentary biological anxiety of the organism 
enmeshed in a universe of contradictory (and presumably) painful sensations. 
To relieve this primitive tension man becomes his own artificer inventing
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fictions of survival with a higher degree of coherence and stability than the 
brute elements of reality seem to possess. Anxious for concords he projects such 
tentative versions of his own history on to the world to “humanise” it and to 
mask its threatening features with his own. This may be a purposive and 
aggressive strategy for confronting an alien reality (making sense of it) or a 
defensive one, keeping pain at bay by aesthetic withdrawals into the house of 
fiction (consolation). At any event it is imperative that the models themselves 
be constantly checked for their resilience and symptoms of obsolescence dutifully 
diagnosed. It is precisely these anticipations of rigidity and the need to adjust 
or replace the models in the interests of a shifting reality which generate the 
ceaseless play of consciousness, the construction of concepts and the endless 
procession of fictional forms (ch. n).
This bears more than a casual resemblance to the Buddhist theory of the 
formation of the skandhas, the psychological process through which we evolve 
models of the self and of the world. Here too our origins are (in Kermode’s 
term) in “poverty,” in a vacuum which we proceed to fill with the outlines of 
simple forms (rupa). “We try to solidify or freeze” the experience of space and 
set boundaries to time. (I am making use of Chftgyam Trungpa’s exposition since 
it conveniently employs the language of modern fiction-theory to describe the 
evolution of a settled sense of identity.) 2 Out of this basic and biological experi­
ence of “aloneness” arises the activity of projection, the ceaseless effort of the 
mind to establish and confirm a “solid” world outside (sanna). The effect is, 
of course, to “humanise” the world, to burden it with our successive attempts 
to grasp it (making sense) or to retreat from it (consolation) or as Trungpa puts 
it to don “a suit of armour” and treat it with indifference (vedana). All this is, 
as it were, the raw material of being, the crude substance which we proceed to 
mould into purposive patterns adapted to our will and needs. We transform 
the world into thought, or as Kermode describes it, “we submit the show of 
things to the desires of the mind” (p. 144) (sankhara). With the fifth skandha 
(vinnana) comes the full flowering of forms, the proliferation of fictions and 
fantasies, the creation of dynamic worlds which we inhabit if not with ease at 
least with the distraction of variable places. The whole elaborate artifice, 
Trungpa concludes, is no more than “an attempt on our part to shield ourselves 
from the truth of our insubstantiality.”3 It is at this point that Trungpa joins 
hands with modem theorists of fiction, those elegists of the lost powers of the 
imagination, which, as they see it, now invents forms only to convict them of 
falseness, and denies them validity except the dubious one of a temporary 
cover for nakedness. The “perpetual readiness to start projecting*’ is no more 
than a plug in the dyke of dissolving emptiness.
2 ChOgyam Trungpa, The Myth of Freedom (Berkeley, 1976), pp. 20-23.
3 Ibid., p. 23.
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There is further common ground. Professor Kermode proposes that our 
attitude towards our man-made fictions should be one of “experimental as­
sent.” It would obviously be wrong, he suggests, to think of the death of King 
Lear as “true” (this would be to dogmatize the text and permit fiction, “the 
consciously false” to harden into myth, an inflexible construct to which we 
commit ourselves absolutely and through which we may disastrously attempt 
to live our lives). Rather we submit ourselves temporarily to its Active powers, 
and through such an act of experimental submission allow them to transform 
us. If the experiment succeeds we change ourselves and by so doing “we have, 
in the best possible indirect way, changed the world” (pp. 3^-40). The corollary 
is a critical alertness (what Kermode calls “clerkly scepticism”), a refusal to 
blind ourselves to the status of our fictions or to mistake our models for ultimate 
truth. Their genuine power lies rather in their “operational effectiveness,” the 
incandescence through which they light up our lives after which they may 
well suffer the fate of other obsolescent schemata.
In all this there is a striking correspondence to the Buddha’s attitude to all 
man-made systems, including his own. He proposed that his own formulations 
were “ficdve” in precisely this way. He exercised a persistent “clerkly scepticism” 
in the face of his followers’ urge to distort the dhamma, to transform an essentially 
experimental path into a rigid landscape of dogma, to mistake the pointing 
finger for the moon itself. The parable of the raft comes to mind straight 
away. The raft had its usefulness, and has proved its “operational effectiveness” 
by taking the man safely across the river. But its work done it would be foolish 
to cling to it as a mode of security or even to retain it. “Even so, monks, is the 
Parable of the Raft dhamma taught by me for crossing over, not for retaining.”4 
But perhaps the Zocur classicus occurs in the Kalama Sutta where the Kalamas 
in a crisis of anxiety over doctrinal disputes approach the Buddha. His advice 
to them strikes a sophisticated balance between “clerkly scepticism” and 
conditional assent. The truth of verbal formulations should be tested on the 
grounds of their “effectiveness,” their simple usefulness and their power to 
change lives:
* The Middle Length Sayings (Majjhima-Nikaya), trans. I. B. Horner (Pali Text So­
ciety, London, 1976), Vol. 1, pp. 173-74.
It is proper for you, Kalamas, to doubt, to be uncertain; uncertainty 
has arisen in you about what is doubtful. Come, Kalamas. Do not go 
upon what has been acquired by repeated hearing; nor upon tradition; 
nor upon rumour; nor upon what is in a scripture; nor upon surmise; 
nor upon an axiom; nor upon specious reasoning; nor upon a bias 
towards a notion that has been pondered over; nor upon another’s 
seeming ability; nor upon the consideration, “The monk is our
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teacher”. . . . Kalamas, when you yourselves know: “These things are 
good; these things are not blamable; these things are praised by the 
wise; undertaken and observed, these things lead to benefit and 
happiness,” enter and abide in them.5
5 Quoted from The Middle Way 53, No. 2 (Summer 1978), pp. 58-9.
6 By contrast Buddhism seems to lack some of the prime ingredients of apocalyptic 
thinking: a fixed god-concept and an obsessive concern with origins and ends.
7 MLS, Vol. 11, pp. 97-101.
It would be as absurd to mistake the dhamma for ultimate reality as it would in 
a literary context to mistake King Lear for truth and attempt to regulate our 
lives by it. Both would exemplify the error of trying, in Kermode’s phrase, 
“to live by that which was designed only to know by” (p. 112).
It is however with the question of the need for and the function of fiction 
that sharp divergencies appear. This is not wholly surprising. In line with most 
Western theorists of fiction, Professor Kermode takes for granted man’s in- 
dispensible need for fictions, while at the same time recognising that Western 
ones are predominantly apocalyptic in type. In rebus men urgently require 
to establish “fictive concords with origins and ends,” to mould the past and 
future into hospitable shapes (ch. 1). Such pattern making, as Kermode shows, 
is closely bound to a rectilinear view of history, dominated by the End, to a 
habit of prophecy and apocalyptic expectation. It is predominantly Western 
and Christian.6 To elaborate fictions is to mitigate and subdue our terrors 
(especially in relation to the End) by charting their temporal forms and 
equiping them with human masks. The effect is to relieve anxiety and to 
console. The Buddha took another view.
This appears at its simplest in the fable of the man pierced by the arrow, 
suffering the apparently inexplicable pain of existence. The effect, as the 
Buddha narrates the tale, is to accelerate his fiction-making urge. The man 
emerges as a budding novelist, weaving explanations out of his pain, inventing 
puzzles and solutions, probing past and future, insisting on knowing who shot 
the arrow, the whys, whens and hows.7 The analogy is with the perennial 
attempt to establish cosmological origins and ends, to employ our speculative 
powers as a salve for the wound of existence. The Buddha clearly recognises 
the connection between the elaboration of fictions and the search for consola­
tion, but he denies their ultimate power to mitigate suffering. The fable 
suggests that they may even exacerbate it by trapping the man in a verbal 
maze and thus distracting him from the realities of his actual condition.
In fact the Buddha was habitually confronted with men who wished to make 
sense of the world and who demanded of him that he establish concords between 
human origins and ends. He presents us, for example, with the anguish of
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the man obsessed with speculations about the past (“Now, was I in a past 
period? Now, was I not in a past period? Now, what was I in a past period? 
Now, how was I in a past period?” etc.); these, as the narrative indicates, 
quickly generate fresh anxieties and transform themselves into projections 
about the future (“Now, will I come to be in a future period? Now, will I not 
come to be in a future period ? Now, how will I come to be in a future period ?” 
etc.). The narrative also insists that it is precisely this wavering, this quest for 
reassurance which in fact never emerges, which induces present anxiety 
(“Now, what am I? Now, how am I?” etc.) and the need to relieve it by 
constructing an inner space, a house of fiction, a permanent self which can 
resist the depredations of time (“It is this self for me that is permanent, stable, 
eternal, not subject to change, that will stand firm like unto the eternal.”)8 
(This is remarkably close to the temporal territory which Kermode assigns 
to novels where in our endeavour to defeat pure successiveness we conspire 
with the author to enter a quasi-etemal dimension of time, which possesses an 
illusory stability that life itself lacks [p. 72]). The Buddha suggests that it is 
just this need to map out our territory and reinforce it with fictions which 
induces alienation and fear.
• MLS, Vol. 1, pp. 10-11.
9 Lama Anagarika Govinda, Creative Meditation and Multi-Dimensional Consciousness 
(Winchester, 1977), p. 276.
Professor Kermode’s theories give primacy to our efforts to organise time 
into habitable patterns, to make pure duration endurable. There is the particu­
lar need to anaesthetize the persistent irruptions of anxiety about the End, “to 
humanise the common death” (p. 7). Yet what seems most valuable (and in 
the West most acceptable) in this kind of speculative activity is what the 
Buddha directly questions. Time and again he probes the origin and consequence 
of the assumption of such a need. The Dhammapada contains the simple injunc­
tion to “be free of the past, be free of things hereafter, be free of middle things” 
(348). This may be interpreted as the call to freedom from consolatory attach­
ment to temporal fictions and to ingrained habits of prediction. (Lama Govinda 
notes that though the Buddha treated the past as “an unquestionable fact” 
and assigned significant ontological status to it, he refused to treat the future 
in the same manner, to predict its pattern or to indulge in prophecy.)9 Put 
simply, metaphysical fictions are obstacles in the path of “realisation”; they 
intensify anxiety and the consequent need to establish a firm and rock-like 
foundation in the self, which the self does not possess. Such “speculative views” 
about origins and ends, in the Buddha's recognition, do “not conduce to turning 
away from, nor to dispassion, stopping, calming, superknowledge, awakening, 
nor to nibbana. I, Vaccha, beholding that this is peril, thus do not approach
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any of these (speculative) views?’10 In the ultimate sense this involves the 
radical experiment of attempting to live without the protective masks and 
constructs of fiction and myth. The first fruit of such an experiment may be 
the intuition that a “hostile world” is a magnified image of our own desire; 
it is precisely the “rage for order” which generates a disordered universe. In 
this sense the assumption of an absolute need for fiction may be itself a danger­
ous fiction.
10 MLS, Vol. n, p. 164.
11 MLSt Vol. i,p. 28.
On the whole Western modes of fiction have been attempts to set verbal 
and symbolic limits to the mind’s random activities. The thrust has been to 
construct, to integrate, to seal off recurring fissures. The Buddhist “experi­
ment” takes the opposite direction. Its basis is not the erection of boundaries 
but their phasing out, their gradual dissolution. From this view the Buddha’s 
own “awakening” appears as a massive shedding of limits, a reception into 
consciousness of the “non-human” recesses of time and space:
Thus with the mind composed, quite purified, quite clarified, without 
blemish, without defilement, grown soft and workable, fixed, immov­
able, I directed my mind to the knowledge and recollection of former 
habitations: I remembered a variety of former habitations thus: 
one birth, two births ... a hundred thousand births, and many an 
eon of integration and many an eon of disintegration and many an eon 
of integration-disintegration . . . ignorance was dispeUed, knowledge 
arose, darkness was dispelled, light arose, even as I abided diligent, 
ardent, self-resolute.11
Thus the infinite eons are realised, not as inhospitable fictions, but as con­
cordant with the nature of “Mind” itself. This is the unimaginable “now­
event,” the point at which the world ex-ists, cleansed of the imprint of man’s 
own fictions, and experimental knowing yields to Being.
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